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The Trade Agreements Act of 19791 (TAA) enacted United
States obligations incurred at the Tokyo Round multilateral trade
negotiations. The TAA and the Tokyo Round are principally trade
liberalizing measures.2 Nevertheless, at least one TAA section
exhibits protectionist characteristics. TAA Section 771(6)3 restricts
1. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
2. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
3. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
Section 771(6) provides:
NET SUBSIDY.-For the purpose of determining the net subsidy, the adminis-
tering authority may subtract from the gross subsidy the amount of-
(A) any application fee, deposit or similar payment paid in order to qual-
ify for, or to receive, the benefit of the subsidy,
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the number of offsets allowed in calculating countervailing duties.4
Briefly, a countervailing duty is a tariff levied to raise the price of an
import benefitting from an exporting nation's subsidy.5 An offset
reduces the countervailing duty to calculate accurately the actual, or
net,6 benefit received by the exporter when accepting a subsidy from
its government.7
Prior to the TAA, the Tariff Act of 19308 allowed the Treasury
Department wide discretion in administering countervailing duties.9
The Treasury Department permitted countervailing duty offsets for
both indirect taxes paid by and dislocation costs incurred by foreign
exporters. 10 An exporter incurs dislocation costs by relocating a
plant site in response to government subsidies." A producer incurs
indirect taxes at each transaction along the path of production.' 2
The restrictive enumeration of offsets in TAA section 771(6) rejects
prior practice. It curtails the discretion of the new countervailing
duty administering authority, the International Trade Administra-
tion,' 3 and refuses to allow dislocation costs or indirect taxes paid,
but not rebated, as countervailing duty offsets.' 4
(B) any loss in the value of the subsidy resulting from its deferred receipt,
if the deferral is mandated by Government order, and
(C) export taxes, duties or other charges levied on the export of merchan-
dise to the United States specifically intended to offset the subsidy received.
Id
4. Id
5. See infra notes 19, 23-24 and accompanying text.
6. Id
7. Id
8. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
9. The Tariff Act of 1930 provided:
(5) The Secretary shall from time to time ascertain and determine, or estimate,
the net amount of each such bounty or grant, and shall declare the net
amount so determined or estimated.
(6) The Secretary shall make all regulations he deems necessary for the identifi-
cation of articles and merchandise subject to duties under this section and
for the assessment and collection of such duties.
Id, ch. 497, tit. III, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687, 19 U.S.C. § 1303(5)-(6) (1976), repealed by
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. I, § 103(b)(1), 93 Stat. 144, 190
(1979).
10. See infra notes 72-73 and 147-50 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
12. These taxes are either value added taxes (VAT) or prior stage cumulative taxes
(PSC). See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
13. On January 2, 1980, President Carter issued an executive order implementing a
wholesale reorganization of United States international trade administration and policy
development. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). The reorganization plan
shifted the responsibility of administering the countervailing duty law from the Treasury
Department to the Commerce Department. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg.
69,273 (1979). See generaly, Graham, The Reorganization of Trade Policy Making: Pros-
pects and Problems, 13 CORNELL INT' L.. 221 (1980).
14. The enumeration of allowable offsets in TAA section 771(6) is "narrowly drawn
and all inclusive." S. REp. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
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The TAA prohibits the offsetting of all dislocation costs. This
Note demonstrates that the TAA's prohibition of dislocation costs as
offsets is unfair to foreign exporters, and does not comport with the
theory of comparative advantage. 15 The Note concludes that section
771(6) should be re-drafted to allow dislocation cost offsets if such
costs are shown by clear evidence.16
Legislative history indicates that Congress was not aware of all
policies relevant to indirect taxes when it promulgated TAA section
771(6). 17 Coincidentally, however, the provision exhibits correct
results in its treatment of indirect taxes. This Note argues that TAA
section 771(6)'s blanket prohibition against allowing indirect taxes as
offsets accords with administrative necessity.' 8 Finally, this Note
seeks to demonstrate an inconsistency between section 771(6) and
section 771(5), which further highlights that Congress was unaware
of certain economic theories relevant to the offset of indirect taxes.
I
OFFSETS IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
A. DEFINITIONS
The concepts of "gross subsidy," "net subsidy," and "actual
export benefit" are crucial to a discussion of countervailing duty and
offset policy. "Gross subsidy" refers to the total benefit a govern-
ment confers to the exporting producer regardless of factors which
may reduce its value. "Net subsidy" is the actual benefit conferred
by the foreign sovereign, after deducting from the gross subsidy fac-
tors which reduce its real value.19 "Actual export benefit" refers to
the net subsidy received by the exporting producer.
The following example, the receiver's fee, illustrates these con-
cepts. The receiver's fee is an offset recognized under Treasury prac-
tice20 and the TAA.21 It is a mandatory payment by the exporter to
CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 472. Dislocation costs and indirect taxes paid but not rebated
are not included in the TAA section 771(6) enumeration and consequently are not allow-
able offsets. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6), 19. U.S.C. § 1677(6) (Supp. IV
1980).
15. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
16. Id
17. See infra notes 172-88 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
19. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
Compare Treasury's use of "effective export benefit" in Leather Handbags From Uru-
guay, 43 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3905 (1978).
20. Oleoresins From India, 44 Fed. Reg. 21,009, 21,010 (1979) ("application" fee)
[hereinafter cited as Oleoresins].
21. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6)(A) 19 U.S.C. § 1677(§ )(A) (Supp. IV
1980).
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the government without which the government will not release the
subsidy benefits. 22 For example, suppose nation X wants to subsi-
dize producer 4 one dollar per item exported. For producer .4 to
receive this subsidy, it must pay Nation X a twenty-five cent
receiver's fee. The dollar paid to producer A is the gross subsidy.
The net subsidy is the seventy-five cent difference between the one
dollar gross subsidy and the twenty-five cent receiver's fee. Seventy-
five cents also represents the actual export benefit. This seventy-five
cent net subsidy represents the competitive advantage the product
has in the United States.
The United States imposes countervailing duties to counteract
export subsidies proscribed by the TAA.2 3 Ideally, the countervailing
duty imposed by the United States counteracts the actual export ben-
efit received by the imported product. As explained above, the
actual export benefit is not always the total subsidy received by the
exporter. The administering authority therefore must reduce, or
"offset," the countervailing duty to allow for factors which reduce
the gross subsidy to the net subsidy that the foreign exporter actually
receives. The imposition of a countervailing duty equal to the gross
subsidy paid by the foreign government oversimplifies the calcula-
tion of a countervailing duty. Discounting factors, such as the
receiver's fee, reduce the benefit received by an exporter, and thus
should not be included in the countervailing duty. The TAA has
provisions specifying both allowable countervailing duties and
allowable offsets.24
B. THE GATT AND SUBSIDIES
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade25 (GATT) is a
22. Oleoresins, supra note 20, at 21,010.
23. The TAA applies countervailing duties against the "net subsidy" received by the
import. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 701(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
The administering authority determines the net subsidy by aggregating the impermissible
subsidies under TAA section 771(5) and subtracting the offsets allowed under TAA sec-
tion 771(6). Id § 771(6).
24. TAA section 771(5) specifies foreign subsidies which will prompt the United
States to impose countervailing duties. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(5), 19
U.S.C. § 1677(5) (Supp. IV 1980). TAA section 771(6) specifies the allowable offsets.
Id, § 771(6).
25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A- 1l, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The text of the General Agreement has
been modified and supplemented since 1947. The current operative text is published in 4
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter cited as BISD].
Some consider GATT overly complex. See Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance on HA 1612, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 92
(1951) ("Anyone who reads GATT is likely to have his sanity impaired.") (statement of
Senator Milliken).
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multilateral trade agreement developed during the post-war era.2 6
In addition, the acronym GATT connotes the organization which
implements the provisions of the Agreement and conducts negotia-
tions for further accords. 27 Early GATT activities focused on the
reduction of protectionist tariffs.28 The GATT achieved significant
tariff reductions during six multilateral tariff conferences, or Rounds,
held between 1947 and 1967.29 The national leaders who negotiated
these limitations on international trade barriers believed that reduc-
ing tariffs ultimately benefitted all nations by encouraging interna-
tional free trade and discouraging retaliatory measures. 30
The economic theory of comparative advantage justifies inter-
national free trade.3' Comparative advantage posits that unnatural
market factors, such as tariffs and subsidies, distort the market and
misallocate resources.32 For example, protectionist tariffs may force
the market price of a foreign producer's good to a level that is
unnaturally above his production costs, 33 thereby allowing a less effi-
26. In 1945, Congress authorized the President to conduct negotiations aimed at
achieving international trade accords. An Act to Extend the Authority of the President
Under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and for Other Purposes, ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410,
19 U.S.C. § 1351-66 (1945). Armed with this grant of authority, the United States took
the primary initiative in organizing the multilateral trade negotiations which eventually
produced the GATT. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 36-37
(1969).
27. Hudec, GA7TTDispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round" An UnfinfshedBusiness,
13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 147 (1980).
28. K. DAm. THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 56-
78 (1970).
29. Id
30. J. JACKSON, supra note 26 at 9-10, 36-39. Professor Jackson notes that the initial
efforts at liberalizing world trade rested on three premises:
(I) International [world] trade is beneficial (which in turn is at least partly based
on premises such as the value of economies of scale, the utility of market
exchange, and ideas stemming from the theory of comparative advantage);
(2) Self-interest economic policies on the international scene contribute to mis-
understanding, instability, and war in international relations generally, and
(3) International agreement on policy is necessary, or at least useful, because
independent national actions to promote trade and stability will usually be frus-
trated by the actions of other states.
Id at 9-10.
31. Id
32. For a basic discussion of the theory or law of comparative advantage see S.
ROBOCK and K. SIMMONDS, INTERNATIONAL BuSINEss AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRisEs 17, 99 (1973). See also G. BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL TRADE
PRACTICES, 273-74 (1980).
33. For the purposes of this Note the term "production costs" shall refer to all costs
incurred by the producer in manufacturing, distributing, marketing, securing, and trans-
porting his goods to the marketplace. As such, the selling price represents production
costs plus profit. The theory of comparative advantage is couched in'terms of market
share, as accorded by efficiency. Yet market share is affected by factors other than effi-
ciency, such as production capacity, elasticity of supply and demand, and the availability
of raw materials. This discussion assumes all other variables are constant. In addition,
the comparative advantage theory dictates only that producers should be allocated a
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cient domestic producer to secure an "undue" portion of the
market.34
During the period in which GATT trade rounds reduced tariffs,
nontariff barriers, including subsidies, became more prevalent.
35
Although the GATT signatories were concerned over the growth of
subsidy-related trade distortions, 36 the initial GATT regulations
were weak and ineffective.37 Before the Tokyo Round Agreements,
the GATT made only interim, non-comprehensive efforts at interna-
tional subsidy control.38 Largely unabated by GATT regulation,
subsidies distorted international trade in a manner comparable to
share of the market comparable to their efficiency; it does not assume that market share
allocation is dependent solely on production efficiency.
34. In this example, if there had been no protectionist tariff, the imported good
would have enjoyed a lower selling price. Demand for the lower-priced good would
have been greater. With the tariff computed into the selling price, however, the imported
good necessarily yields a portion of the market it would have captured if there had been
no tariff. Because tariffs are unnatural market factors that misallocate resources, this
portion is considered "undue."
35. J. JACKSON, supra note 26 at 368. See GATT, BISD (10th Supp.), at 201, 203,
204-10 (1962). See also GATT, BISD (9th Supp.), at 185-94 (1961).
36. J. JACKSON, supra note 26 at 367. GATT had already become sensitive to the
effects of subsidies; but the early rounds of negotiation could not achieve consensus with
regard to subsidies. Id This difficulty rested on many factors:
From its inception GATT has been concerned with subsidies, but there has
been great difficulty in obtaining a consensus for any common approach to the
problem of international regulation of subsidies. This is due in part to the com-
plexity of the subject and the difficulty of drawing the line between justifiable
government policies, on the one hand, and policies that constitute a dangerous
and improper attempt to export one's own problems at the expense of foreign
nations, on the other hand. The difficulty in reaching a consensus on subsidies
also reflects a view that they are a preferable means of protection, as compared
with tariffs or quotas. The subsidy can promote and expand international trade
rather than restrict it because, so the theory goes, if subsidies lower the price of
the product, it will increase consumption. The economist will readily detect the
premise of price elasticity of demand that lies behind this theory, a premise that
does not always accord with reality. A subsidy may have a "trade diverting"
effect rather than a "trade creating" effect, i.e., may shift sales away from another
exporting country rather than increase the overall amount of sales.
Id at 367-68.
37. The original GATT subsidy article merely required that signatories notiy GATT
of the "extent. . . nature . . . estimated effect and. . . circumstances" of the subsidy
and consult with other signatories as to possible injurious effects. GATT, supra note 25,
art. XVI, % I.
38. The only significant measure of regulation that GATT reached in the intervening
years between the original accord (1947) and the Tokyo Round were "standstill" agree-
ments (first agreed upon in 1955 and subsequently extended) which "froze" subsidies at
existing levels. J. JACKSON, supra note 26 at 371-76. These "standstill" agreements were
promulgated in the hope that an agreement abolishing distortive subsidies eventually
would be negotiated. Id at 373 n.12. The Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code,
negotiated in the Tokyo Round, represents the manifestation of that hope. The Agree-
ment on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII'of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/236 reprinted in BISD
(26th Supp.), at 56-83 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Subsidies Code]. Although not all
subsidies are abolished under the Code, the most distortive types are. Id, Annex A and
Interpretive Notes, BISD (26th Supp.), at 80-83.
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protectionist tariffs.39
The Tokyo Round produced several agreements regulating
nontariff trade barriers.40 Many consider the Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Duties Code4 l. (Subsidies Code), however, to be the "key-
stone" of the six year trade conference. 42 The Subsidies Code is
crucial because of the widespread use of subsidies43 and the differing
subsidy approaches prevailing among the major trading nations.44
The tension between the United States and the European
nations provided the focus of the Subsidies Code negotiations.45 The
European nations traditionally have relied on government subsidiza-
tion of private industry. Consequently, European negotiators were
reluctant to suffer penalties for such subsidization.4 6 The United
States, on the other hand, traditionally has opposed government
intervention into private industry and unilaterally has penalized sub-
sidized imports as a method of protecting domestic industry.47 Prior
to the Tokyo Round, there were no legal limitations on the ability of
the United States to impose countervailing duties.
The GATT, however, restricted the ability of other signatory
nations to impose countervailing duties. According to GATT Article
VI:6(a),48 a signatory nation could impose a countervailing duty only
if the foreign subsidy caused "material injury" to a domestic indus-
try. Prior to the Tokyo Round, the United States was exempt from
the "material injury" requirement because its countervailing duty
39. Just as tariffs allow less efficient domestic producers to capture domestic markets
that more efficient foreign exporters normally would dominate, subsidies permit less effi-
cient foreign exporters to capture other markets by being able to sell at a price which
does not accurately reflect production costs. As such, subsidies disrupt the comparative
advantage the most efficient producer should enjoy. See generally S. ROBoCK and K.
SIMMONDS, supra note 32 and G. BRYAN, supra note 32 at 273.
40. Among the agreements reached during the Tokyo Round were the following:
(1) further reciprocal tariff reductions; (2) a new antidumping agreement; (3) an agree-
ment on government procurements; (4) a technical trade barrier (standards) agreement;
(5) an accord on customs valuation; (6) an attempt to regulate import licensing systems;
(7) a reform of dispute settlement procedures; (8) an agreement concerning special trade
treatment of developing countries; and (9) various sectoral agreements on agriculture,
dairy products, aircraft, steel, and meat. Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. .
INT'L & CoMP. L. 153, 160-73 (1979).
41. Subsidies Code, supra note 38.
42. Feller, Preface-Observations on the New Countervailing Duty Law, 11 LAW &
POL'Y INT. Bus. 1439, 1440 (1979); Graham, Revolution in Trade Policies, FOREIGN
PoL'Y, Fall 1979, at 49, 52.
43. Rivers and Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAW & Poc'Y INT'L Bus., 1452
1452-53 (1979).
44. Id at 1448-49.
45. Id at 1453.
46. Id at 1448-49.
47. Id
48. GATT, supra note 25, Art. VI: 6(a), 4 BISD at 11.
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legislation, the Tariff Act of 1930, pre-dated the ratification of
GATT Article VI: 6(a).49 The Tariff Act of 1930 allowed counter-
vailing duties at the discretion of the Treasury Secretary, regardless
of any injury suffered by United States industry.50 The Tokyo
Round subsidy negotiations initially centered around restrictions on
the unilateral ability of the United States to impose countervailing
duties.5 1
The acceptance of the "material injury" requirement by the
United States triggered movement in the stalled negotiations.5 2 The
United States government agreed that before it could impose coun-
tervailing duties, it had to determine that the subsidized imports
caused "material injury" to a domestic industry. In return for this
concession, the United States secured, inter alia, a prohibition of
industrial export subsidies53 and an extensive annex to the agree-
ment illustrating impermissible export subsidies.5 4 Although United
States negotiators believed that it was defensible for the United
States to accept an injury requirement without corresponding con-
cessions, they also realized that mutual compromise was necessary to
secure domestic approval of the trade package. 55 United States
negotiators were concerned that Congress would never ratify a lib-
eral trade accord which ignored the concerns of domestic industry.56
49. The GATT applies to contracting parties through a Protocol of Provisional
Application which was signed on October 30, 1947. The Protocol exempts legislation
already "existing" at the time the agreement was signed. Protocol of Provisional Appli-
cation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I, para. (b), 61 Stat. A 2051,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, reprinted in 4 BISD at 77.
50. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
51. Rivers and Greenwald, supra note 43 at 1449.
52. After over five years of negotiations there had been alarmingly little progress. In
the words of one commentator, "[t]he negotiations went nowhere (and did so slowly)."
Id
53. Id at 1475-76. Subsidies Code, supra note 38, Art. 9, BISD (26th Supp.) at 68.
54. Rivers and Greenwald, supra note 43 at 1449. Subsidies Code, supra note 38,
Annex A, Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, BISD (26th Supp.), at 80-83.
55. Rivers and Greenwald note:
The United States, like its trading partners, had both a political and an economic
interest in including an injury test in the law. If the British, French or Brazilians
have a serious problem with U.S. policies, it is by definition a U.S. problem as
well. The Administration, in its deliberations, was just as concerned about a rash
of countervailing duty actions against hams from Denmark, steel from the
United Kingdom and manufactured products from Brazil as the Danes, the Brit-
ish, and the Brazilians. In addition to difficult political problems created by such
actions, the national economic interest was hardly served by a law that erected
higher import barriers where the imports in question caused no injury to any
domestic industry.
Rivers and Greenwald, supra note 43, at 1454.
56. Proper characterization appears to have been an important lobbying technique.
Writing on the efforts of the administration to get the TAA through Congress, one com-
mentator noted: "Mr. Strauss has been taking the aggressive line he knows Congress
wants to hear, he sometimes sounds as though he were supporting a piece of protectionist
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The drafters of the TAA also wondered whether a trade bill which
was not in the best interest of the domestic economy would be politi-
cally troublesome for legislators representing districts producing
goods in competition with subsidized imports.57 Accordingly, the
TAA contained several provisions with protectionist elements.
The Subsidies Code greatly affected United States counter-
vailing duty calculation. The signatories to the Subsidies Code,
including the United States, adopted specific provisions identifying
and quantifying impermissible export subsidies.5 8 The United States
adopted the provisions identifying subsidies in section 771(5) of the
rather than liberal trade legislation." Silk, Economic Sense-Now to Sell the Trade Pact,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1979, § IV, at 2, col. 1.
57. This became especially important after the release of a Congressional Budget
Office Study on the impact of the TAA, which predicted a loss of jobs in the urban
manufacturing centers of the Northeast. Farnsworth, Harm to Northeast Seen in Trade
Pact, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1979, § 1, at 23, col. I.
58. The list of impermissible subsidies did not include dislocation costs. It did, how-
ever, consider the following tax practices to be impermissible subsidies:
(g) The exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribution
of exported products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the
production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic
consumption.
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect
taxes' on goods or services used in the production of exported products in excess
of the exemption, remission or deferral of like prior stage cumulative indirect
taxes on goods or services used in the production of like products when sold for
domestic consumption; provided, however, that prior state cumulative indirect
taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when
not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic con-
sumption, if the prior stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on goods that are
physically incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported
product.3
NOTES
I For the purpose of this Agreement:
The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interest, rents,
royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real
property.
The term "import charges" shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges
not elsewhere enumerated in this note that are levied on imports.
The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added,
franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and
all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges.
"Prior stage" indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly
or indirectly in making the product.
"Cumulative" indirect taxes are multi-staged taxes levied where there is no
mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject
to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding stage of production.
"Remission" of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes....
3 Paragraph (h) does not apply to value-added tax systems, and border tax
adjustment in lieu thereof and the problem of the excessive remission of
value-added taxes is exclusively covered by paragraph (g) ....
Subsidies Code, supra note 38, Annex I, Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, BISD (26th
Supp.), at 81, 82.
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TAA, and the provisions quantifying subsidies in section 771(6) of
the TAA.
C. THE TAA: CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT OF THE SUBSIDIES
CODE
Enacting legislation to implement the terms of an international
trade accord that was negotiated by the executive branch is signifi-
cantly different from the normal legislative process. The executive
branch commits the United States government to certain agree-
ments, and Congress does not have complete freedom to mold and
shape the implementing legislation. Unwritten rules of intra-govern-
ment comity and political common sense dictate that Congress must
include the major provisions and the basic policies of executive
negotiated agreements in the implementing legislation. Beyond the
essential provisions and policies, however, some room exists for the
give-and-take of domestic political compromise. It was within these
bounds that Congress formulated many aspects of the TAA.
Congress enacted and modified the Subsidies Code enumera-
tion of impermissible export subsidies in TAA section 771(5).59 This
provision identifies the gross subsidies. TAA section 771(5)(A)
incorporates Subsidies Code Annex A by reference.60 In TAA sec-
tion 771(5)(B), Congress added four domestic subsidies to the GATT
listing.61 Congress thus modified the Subsidies Code enumeration of
countervailable subsidies by adding additional domestic subsidies
which would trigger United States countervailing .duties. In so
doing, Congress promoted protectionist goals.
TAA section 771(6) provides specific guidelines for calculating
offsets:
59. TAA section 771(5) includes the following as impermissible export subsidies:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (relating to
illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government
action to a specific enterprise or industry; or group of enterprises or industries,
whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or bestowed directly or
indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of
merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsis-
tent with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses
sustained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, produc-
tion, or distribution.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(5), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (Supp. IV 1980). For the
provisions of Annex A relevant to this note and incorporated into TAA § 77 1(5) see
supra note 58.
60. Id
61. Id
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(6) Net Subsidy.-For the purpose of determining the net subsidy, the
administering authority may subtract from the gross subsidy the amount of-
(A) any application fee, deposit, or similar payment paid in
order to qualify for, or to receive, the benefit of the subsidy,
(B) any loss in the value of the subsidy resulting from its
deferred receipt, if the deferral is mandated by Government order,
and
(C) export taxes, duties, or other charges levied on the
export of merchandise to the United States specifically intended to
offset the subsidy received.
62
The administering authority deducts the offsets from the gross sub-
sidy to determine the net subsidy. The countervailing duty counter-
acts the net subsidy. This provision differs considerably from prior
practice. Previous legislation, the Tariff Act of 1930, authorized
Treasury discretion in determining offsets.63 Section 771(6) limits
the administering authority to the offsets specified.64 Legislative his-
tory shows that Congress intended section 771(6) to limit discretion
in administering net subsidy calculations and desired to eliminate
both dislocation costs65 and unrebated taxes from offset considera-
tion.6 6 Decisions of the International Trade Administration, the new
administering authority, reflect this congressional intent.67
Congress exercised its limited ability to alter the Subsidies Code
when it enacted TAA sections 771(5) and 771(6). Both provisions
promote protectionist goals and counteract the free trade ideal of the
Subsidies Code. TAA section 771(5) adds to the Subsidies Code list-
ing of impermissible subsidies, making it more likely that subsidies
will be found and countervailing duties imposed. In drafting section
62. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
63. See supra notes 8-9, 48-50 and accompanying text.
64. The Senate Report notes:
The bill defines the "net subsidy" to place clear limits on offsets from a gross
subsidy. The gross subsidy is the value of the subsidy provided, or made avail-
able, and used .... For purposes of determining the net subsidy, there is sub-
tracted from the gross subsidy only the items specified in section 771(6). The list
is narrowly drawn and is all inclusive. For example, offsets under present law
which are permitted for indirect taxes paid but not actually rebated, or for
increased costs as a result of locating in an underdeveloped area, are not now
permitted as offsets. In determining the amount of offsets which are permitted, it
is expected that the administering authority will offset amounts which are defi-
nitely established by reliable, verified evidence ....
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 381, 471-72. (emphasis added).
65. Id
66. Id
67. Michelin X-Radial Steel Belted Tires From Canada, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,676 (1981)
(dislocation costs); Leather Wearing Apparel From Mexico, 46 Fed. Reg. 21,357 (1981);
Certain Iron Metal Fasteners From India, 45 Fed. Reg. 64,611 (1980); Textiles and Tex-
tile Mill Products From India, 45 Fed. Reg. 5,502 (1980) (indirect tax rebates). See also
Administrative and Interpretative Guidelines For Determination and Calculation of
Subsidies, 19 C.F.R. § 355.44, Annex 1 (1981).
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771(6), Congress limited the administering authority's discretion in
reducing the net subsidy by injecting into a liberally oriented trade
package a provision which restricted the administration's ability to
find offsets. In effect, this provision results in higher countervailing
duties and protection for domestic industry.68
II
DISLOCATION COSTS
A. PRACTICE PRIOR TO THE TAA
Many countries attempt to foster national economic and social
goals by promoting the industrial development of depressed domes-
tic regions.69 These governments grant various relocation subsidies
to induce producers to move to such areas. Without the subsidies,
the producer would not relocate. Dislocation costs are expenses
solely incurred by a producer when relocating to an economically
disadvantaged region. Such costs may be operational, such as
increased utility costs in a remote area70 or increased labor cost
68. This analysis is supported by free trade advocates. Washington Lobbyist Robert
L. McNeil believes § 771(6) will "certainly have a protectionist effect" and that it repre-
sents "a reassertion of congressional will" to protect domestic industry from foreign
imports. Telephone interview with Robert L. McNeil, Executive Vice Chairman of the
Emergency Committee for American Trade (January 15, 1982). In general terms, dissat-
isfaction with Treasury's handling of the CVD cases was the primary reason for § 771(6).
Those that support limiting the discretion of the Treasury Department can be divided
into two groups: those who saw Treasury's approach as potentially harming domestic
industry, and those who thought that Treasury's discretion was being manipulated by
other forces in the government. Specifically, some legislators felt that CVD cases were
being decided to facilitate or secure international political goals and agreements. Tele-
phone interview with William Reinsch, Chief Legislative Assistant for Senator Heinz
(January 18, 1982), and telephone interview with Jeffrey Lang, General Counsel for the
Senate Finance Committee (minority) (January 18, 1982).
69. MANUAL FOR THE PREPARATION OF INDUSTRIAL FEASIBILITY STUDIES (United
Nations) 88 (1978) (noting that both lesser developed countries and industrially
advanced nations grant subsidies to industries if they locate in particular regions). The
literature on economic development with respect to lesser developed countries and
regions is vast. See, ag., I. LITTLE, T. SCITOVSKY, AND M. SCOTT, INDUSTRY AND
TRADE IN SOME DEVELOPING COUNTIES, 230-70 (1970) (general discussion of export
incentives); G. CUKOR, STRATEGmS FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 110-14 (1971) (discussing the proper role of government); R. PANDEY AND H.
SHOUIE, EXPORT INcENTrvEs IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (1967) (sur-
vey of incentive mechanisms); B. BALASSA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRA-
TION 65-84 (1967) (discussing generally the role of exports in the process of economic
growth); P. ALPERT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 128 (1963) ("The promotion of village
industries as a means of providing additional sources of income and employment to rural
populations is an essential aspect of community development plans".); R. MEIER,
DEVELOPMENTAL PLANNING, 174-80 (1965) (discussing techniques for stimulating local
industry); Selwyn, Markets and the Location ofIndustry--The egionalPlanning of indus-
try, in INDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEVELOPING CoUTRIrES 101-02 (R. Robinson ed. 1965)
(tax concessions used to encourage location of industry in depressed areas).
70. Bromine and Brominated Compounds from Israel, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,746 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Bromine].
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resulting from the added commuting time that workers must spend
to reach a new remote location.7' Such costs also may be capital
expenditures incurred in the relocation itself, such as the cost of
transporting heavy equipment. Increased operational costs are a
recurring expense. Capital relocation costs are a distinct non-recur-
ring expense. Nevertheless, both forms of dislocation costs increase
a producer's overall costs and result directly from the relocation.
Both forms of dislocation costs reduce the actual export benefit
received by the subsidized producer. Thus, offsetting dislocation
costs, either operational or capital, does not confer an unjust compet-
itive benefit on the importer, rather it accurately calculates the
importer's actual export benefit.
Under the discretion provided by the Trade Act of 1930, the
Treasury Department allowed certain dislocation costs to offset for-
eign subsidies. Generally, Treasury deducted only increased opera-
tional expenses.72 The Treasury Department did not offset the cost
of the act of relocation.73
Treasury decisions from the period just prior to the TAA did
not accept all dislocation cost claims blindly.74 Working without
congressional guidelines, the Secretary recognized the potential for
abuse if offsets were granted in a summary fashion. Consequently,
Treasury required the producer to identify and verify the dislocation
costs to the satisfaction of the Secretary.75 In addition, the producer
had to prove that the costs were incurred after the government had
authorized relocation assistance. Treasury decisions held that a pro-
ducer's relocation prior to the grant of government subsidies demon-
strated that the relocation presented a favorable cost benefit
relationship, and that dislocation cost rebates constituted apost-hoc
subsidy.76 Even with these limitations, however, Treasury was reluc-
tant to rely solely on the claim of the producer. When the possibility
of long term relocation savings appeared, the Secretary disallowed
offsets for established costs, reasoning that the move was made for
71. Diuron from Israel, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,860 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Diuron].
72. In Bromine, supra note 70, Treasury found that increased labor and electricity
costs at the new site exceeded the development assistance supplied by the Israeli govern-
ment. There was no net benefit accruing to the producer from the development assist-
ance and therefore Treasury imposed no countervailing duty.
73. Id
74. Eg., Non-Rubber Footwear and Handbags From Uruguay, 43 Fed. Reg. 3904,
3905 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Leather Handbags]; see Notice of Revised Method of
Calculation of Bounty or Grant with Regard to Certain Indirect Taxes, 44 Fed. Reg.
3478, 3479 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Revised Method]; Bromine, supra note 71; Diuron,
supra note 73; Oleoresins, supra note 20.
75. See supra note 74. See also infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
76. Oleoresins, supra note 20.
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commercial reasons independent of government inducement. 77
Until the enactment of the TAA, Treasury proceeded on an ad hoc
basis, having established neither a comprehensive definition of dislo-
cation costs nor an efficient means of calculation.
B. TAA CHANGES AND CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The TAA removes the Treasury Department's discretion in
allowing dislocation costs as offsets to countervailing duties. TAA
section 771(6) contains an inclusive enumeration of allowable off-
sets.7 8  Dislocation costs, either operational or capital, are not
included in the enumeration.79 Furthermore, the legislative history
demonstrates that Congress desired to remove dislocation costs from
the list of permissible offsets.8 0 Thus, the TAA drastically alters
Treasury practice.
The legislative history of the TAA reveals three major justifica-
tions for the change with regard to dislocation costs.8' Congress
believed that allowing dislocation costs as offsets would disrupt com-
parative advantage, present calculation difficulties, and mask possi-
ble cost savings.82
Congress apparently believed that allowing dislocation costs as
offsets would disrupt the comparative advantage enjoyed by the
most efficient producer.83 If that was the prevailing opinion, Con-
77. Diuron, supra note 72.
78. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
79. Id
80. Id
81. The only legislative history that provides evidence of the reasons that led Con-
gress to eliminate dislocation costs from net subsidy calculation is the Senate floor
debate, wherein Senator Heinz articulated three substantive reasons for the change:
[T]he committee voted to exclude regional aids. Clearly, a payment for locating
a plant in a particular region of a country is a subsidy. However, it has been
Treasury's practice to offset such a subsidy with its estimate of any additional
costs of locating in that region, inevitably a calculation of great inaccuracy.
The theory is that if the company has a choice of locating in either region A or
B of a country and would normally choose A because the cost to locate in B is
greater, a subsidy to offset the cost of locating in B has no effect on exports from
the territory of the subsidy-granting country. That is, the price of the product
produced in B will be the cost less the subsidy that is equal to the additional
location cost plus profit which is the same as the price (cost plus profit) of a
product produced in A.
[1] The difficulty with this theory is that this type of subsidy is functionally no
different than any subsidy that has the purpose of eliminating a comparative
disadvantage. [2] It is also impossible to calculate with any precision the addi-
tional location costs with the result that the true effect of the subsidy can be
masked. [3] Finally an offset of this nature would not take into account savings
achieved by location decisions, such as labor rate differentials, raw material
availability, and so forth ....
125 CONG. Rnc. 20,167-68 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Heinz).
82. Id
83. Id
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gress was incorrect. Unless the exporter receives an actual export
benefit, comparative advantage is not disrupted. Dislocation costs
reduce the export benefit received, so allowing them as offsets
accords with the comparative advantage theory.84 On a theoretical
level, section 771(6) is unjustified insofar as it disallows dislocation
costs as offsets.
TAA proponents believed that a precise calculation of disloca-
tion costs was impossible.8 5 They feared that foreign nations would
inflate dislocation cost claims to mask subsidy benefits. 86 In addi-
tion, the prevailing United States political sentiment desired a provi-
sion that would protect domestic industry.87 In fairness, however,
the United States should allow dislocation costs which are conclu-
sively documented.8 8 Allowing verified dislocation costs to act as
offsets is fairer than prohibiting all dislocation costs even if
documented.
The legislative history of the TAA indicates that all offsets per-
mitted under section 771(6) should be "definitively established by
reliable, verified evidence."8 9 This standard could apply to disloca-
tion costs as well as to those offsets that are included within section
771(6). In addition, the historic cost, against which increased reloca-
tion costs will be compared, should be subject to a "definitively
established by reliable, verified evidence" standard. For example, if
the relocating firm previously has produced the product which will
be manufactured at the new location, the ITA should use as a refer-
ence the "definitively established" cost of goods and services at the
firm's original location. Thus, the ITA could exercise caution and
still allow dislocation costs as offsets by permitting dislocation costs
only when the producer conclusively documents both the original
84. An analogy to the receiver's fee example is helpful in understanding why disloca-
tion costs do not disrupt the comparative advantage of the most efficient producer. See
supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. Both dislocation costs and receiver's fees are
expenses necessarily incurred as a precondition to the receipt of subsidy benefits. As
such, both should be allowed to offset the amount of the net subsidy. Dislocation costs
are a unique production expense; offsetting the gross subsidy in their amount facilitates
relocation within the foreign country without decreasing the price of goods abroad.
Because United States CVD law will adjust the price upward in the amount of the net
subsidy, United States industries need not be alarmed at the prospect of legitimate dislo-
cation costs acting as offsets.
85. See supra note 81.
86. Id
87. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
88. The administering authority could further the goals of fairness and accuracy by
incorporating into dislocation cost analysis the limiting factors that evolved under Treas-
ury practice. Like Treasury, the ITA could allow dislocation costs only if the firm other-
wise would not have relocated. Diuron, supra note 72. Similarly, the ITA could look to
the timing of government benefits and attempt to ensure that remissions of dislocation
costs were notpost hoc subsidies. Oleoresins, supra note 75.
89. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 64.
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cost level and the increased cost level. This approach would force
the foreign producer to substantiate actual costs, assist the ITA in
ascertaining the amount of actual export benefit, and protect domes-
tic industry.
The third justification given by Congress concerned cost savings
resulting from relocation.90 Congress decided that dislocation offsets
would not account for "savings achieved by location decisions, such
as labor rate differentials, raw material availability, and so forth." 91
Consequently, Congress feared that manufacturers would reap an
unjust comparative advantage. The original precondition for per-
mitting government subsidized regional development to offset coun-
tervailing duties was that government subsidies provided the
relocation inducement.92 Relocation cost savings alone were insuffi-
cient to prompt private relocation. Treasury permitted offsets
equivalent to relocation costs only if the relocation assistance was
necessary to induce the manufacturer to relocate. Yet, if cost savings
exist that reduce the actual dislocation cost, they also affect the bene-
fit received and should be considered. Thus, congressional concern
with relocation cost savings is justified.
To prevent abuse of a dislocation cost offset provision, the
administering authority must require strict adherence to a strict stan-
dard. Potential cost savings of relocation present a problem of abuse
if not exhaustively investigated. Savings may result from the
decreased cost of labor, raw materials, or other services at the new
location. To require the United States administering authority, how-
ever, to be responsible for such investigation would be an over-
whelming and expensive burden. Thus, to effectively administer
dislocation costs as offsets, much of the burden must be borne by the
exporter or his government. The only alternative that avoids placing
an intolerable burden on the administering authority, and gives the
exporter an incentive to calculate potential cost savings, is to create a
presumption of intolerable cost savings, absent conclusively verified
documentation to the contrary. Granted, this saddles the exporter
with a burden it may not wish to discharge, yet in the event that cost
savings are minimal as compared to dislocation costs, the exporter
has an incentive to verify savings.
This proposal provides incentives for exporters to prove reloca-
tion cost savings. Nevertheless, the review of cost savings is contin-
gent upon adequate verification. Either of two verification standards
could make this proposal effective. First, the administering author-
90. See supra note 81.
91. Id
92. See supra note 69.
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ity must be vested with complete discretion to evaluate the veracity
of cost savings documentation and to disallow completely disloca-
tion cost offsets if the data are unsatisfactory. Second, cost savings
documentation should be verified by the exporter's government in
some formal fashion. Although both the exporter and its govern-
ment have an incentive to secure favorable trade treatment for their
products, they are less likely to falsify documentation if United
States regulations require formal verification.
III
INDIRECT TAXES
Unlike the United States, which relies on a direct income tax,
many countries primarily employ indirect taxes.93 An income tax is
direct because the government seeks to tax directly the income
earned by a producer.94 An indirect tax, however, is assessed upon
the goods produced rather than on the producer.95 Thus, the pro-
ducer is taxed only indirectly. All European nations and the United
States adopted direct income taxes before 1914.96 During World
War I, the European nations developed indirect tax systems.97 Pres-
ently, indirect taxes are the principal form of European Economic
Community taxation.98 Turnover taxes, paid at each transaction
during the manufacture of a product, are a common form of indirect
tax.99 The complex operation of turnover tax systems, requiring tax
payments, withholding allowances, and government remissions,10o
provide opportunities for foreign governments to subsidize produ-
cers. Accordingly, they create problems for United States trade offi-
cials attempting to locate and quantify foreign subsidy practices.
93. The European nations and the European Economic Community (EEC) rely
heavily on indirect taxes. The EEC countries on the average get more than half of their
total tax revenue from indirect taxes. M. VON STEINAECKER, DOMESTIC TAXATION AND
FOREIGN TRADE: THE UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN BORDER TAX DISPUTE 4 (1973).
94. Id at 3 n. *. The Subsidies Code defines "direct taxes" to include "taxes on
wages, profits, interest rents, royalties and all other forms of income, and taxes on the
ownership of real property." Subsidies Code, Annex I, supra note 38.
95. M. VON STEINAECKER, supra note 93, at 3 n.*. The Subsidies Code defines "indi-
rect taxes" to include, "sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer,
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and
import charges." Subsidies Code, Annex I, supra note 38.
96. M. VON STEiNAECKER, supra note 93, at 4.
97. Id at 5-6.
98. The EEC collects revenue throughout Europe using a value added tax which
applies a rate not exceeding one percent, to an assessment basis which is determined in a
uniform manner for Member States according to Community rules. A. EASSON, TAX
LAW AND POLICY IN THE EEC 124 (1980).
99. A turnover tax is levied on businessmen and computed as a percentage of their
turnover. M. VON STEINAECKER, supra note 93, at 5.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 103-17 for an explanation of indirect tax sys-
tem mechanics.
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After a background section, explaining the two principal indirect tax
systems, and an economic assessment of indirect taxes, this Note will
analyze present United States offset practice. In particular, the Note
will highlight the change in offset practice prescribed by the TAA
with regard to the payment of indirect taxes that are not rebated, and
will discuss the inconsistency between TAA section 771(5), which
allows tax remissions without countervailing duties, and TAA sec-
tion 771(6), which fails to allow an offset for the payment of indirect
taxes without rebate.
A. BACKGROUND
1. Turnover Tax Systems
There are two major types of turnover tax systems: prior-stage
cumulative taxes (PSC) and value-added taxes (VAT).'O' Both sys-
tems assess taxes at each transaction during the production of a
product. 02 Withholding practices, however, distinguish the systems
and provide significant differences in United States countervailing
duty treatment.
A foreign government imposes PSC taxes at every exchange in a
production process based upon a percentage of the full value of the
product at the time of each sale.10 3 Because the tax is assessed upon
the full value of the product, it incorporates the cumulative value
added by all previous producers. The effect is cumulative because at
each transaction the levy is paid on a base increased by all previous
increases in the value of the product.1°4 This "snowball" effect,
101. M. VON STEINAECKER, supra note 93, at 5 n.5.
102. Id
103. Id; K. DAM, supra note 28, at 123.
104. Id,M. VON STEINAECKER, supra note 93, at 5 n.5. This concept is explained best
using the following example. Assume that manufacturers A, B and C combine to pro-
duce widgets. Each producer adds a value of $10 to the product and they market the
widgets through a retailer, D, who adds no value. The government taxes each transac-
tion at 10% and there are no costs assumed by the first producer, A. The government
assesses the tax at each exchange, i.e. the sale from A to B, the sale from B to C and the
sale from C to D. The tax assessed on the sale from A to B would be 10% of A's value
added (10), or one dollar (10 x 10% = 1). The tax assessed on the sale from B to C would
be 10% of both A's (10) and B's (10) value added (10 + 10 = 20), or two dollars. The tax
assessed on the sale from C to D would be 10% of A's (10), B's (10) and C's (10) value
added (10 + 10 + 10 = 30), or three dollars. D then sells the widget at retail without
adding any value to the product. The total tax incidence equals six dollars and is sum-
marized in the following graph:
Producer Cost Value Added Tax
A 0 10 1
B 10 10 2
C 20 10 3
D 30 0 0
Total 30 6
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where the purchaser pays a tax on previous increments in value, is
graphically referred to as a "cascade" tax.105 In addition, the
amount of tax paid on a finished product varies depending upon the
number of transactions during the production process.10 6 Thus, the
PSC system presents an accounting problem because the amount of
tax depends upon the integration of the production process, not the
value of the final good. Identical goods may be subject to different
amounts of tax because of differing production integration.
Under a VAT system, a business pays a tax only on the value it
adds to the product. 0 7 As with PSC taxes, the government assesses a
tax at each transaction on the full value of the product at the time of
each sale;'0 8 however, the government permits the seller collecting
the tax to withhold the amount he paid in taxes to a prior pro-
ducer. 10 9 Thus, while the seller collects a tax on all accumulated
The escalation in the taxes charged at each stage of production results from the calcula-
tion of the tax upon the total value of the product at that stage of production, including
the value added by previous producers and taxed in a previous transaction. Thus, the tax
collected on the transaction between B and C (2 dollars) reimposed a tax on the value
added by A, even though the government previously had collected a tax on that value in
the transaction between A and B.
105. K. DAM, supra note 28, at 123.
106. Id Returning to the example given supra at note 104, this concept may be
demonstrated if we postulate a merger between B and C. The merged firm now adds a
value of $20 to the widget. All other factors remain the same. Producer A has no costs,
but adds a value of $10 to the widget. The government assesses its one dollar tax (10% X
10 = 1) on the transfer of the uncompleted widget to B/C. Producer B/C then processes
the widget adding $20 in value, raising the widget's value to $30. The government
assesses a 3 dollar tax (30 x 10% = 3) on the transfer of the completed widget to D. D
then sells the widget at retail without adding any value to the widget. The taxes paid on
the finished product total four dollars. The following graph illustrates the example:
Producer Cost Value Added Tax
A 0 10 1
B/C 10 20 3
D 30 0 0
Total 30 4
As in the note 104 example, the manufacturers created a finished widget with a 30 dollar
value. The widget in this example, however, was taxed four dollars, and the widget in
the previous example was taxed six dollars. The merger of producers B and C created
the different levels of taxation because it eliminated a transaction, and the taxation of the
widget between B and C. Thus, the amount of tax assessed on a good in a PSC system is
dependent upon the number of transactions in its production, not the value of the
finished good.
107. M. VoN STaNACKER, supra note 93, at 5 n.5.
108. Id
109. Id The lack of cascade effect in the VAT system is best illustrated using an exam-
ple based upon the hypothetical presented supra at note 104. As in note 104, manufac-
turers A, B and C combine to produce widgets. Each producer adds a value of $10 to the
product. They market the widgets through a retailer, D. The government taxes each
transaction at 10% and there are no costs assumed by the first producer, A. Producer A
has no costs, but adds a value of $10 to the widget. The government assesses its one
dollar tax (10 X 10% = 1) on the transfer of the uncompleted widget to B. B then
processes the widget adding $10 in value raising the widget's value to $20. The govern-
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value, he does not remit the entire amount to the government. The
seller withholds an amount equal to the taxes paid to a previous pro-
ducer, thereby readjusting the taxes paid so that the seller's net taxes
only account for the value it adds to the product. The VAT does not
incorporate the cumulative value added by all previous producers at
each transaction. The tax does not "cascade." Because there is no
cascading, the total amount of tax paid on a finished product does
not vary with the number of transactions incurred during produc-
tion.110 The VAT withholding practice encourages producers to
maintain accurate tax and production records. Thus, a VAT system,
unlike a PSC system, is very accountable.' In addition, VAT sys-
ment assesses a two dollar tax (20 x 10% = 2) on the transfer of the uncompleted widget
to C. B, however, does not remit the entire two dollars to the government. B may with-
hold the one dollar he paid to the previous producer, A, from the government. Thus, B is
only taxed the one dollar corresponding to his value added. C processes the widget
adding $10 in value, raising the widget's value to $30. The government assesses its three
dollar tax (30 x 10% = 3) on the transfer of the uncompleted widget to D. C, however,
does not remit the entire three dollars to the government. C may withhold the two dol-
lars in tax he paid to the previous producer, B. Thus, C is only taxed the one dollar
corresponding to his value added. D then sells the widget at retail without adding any
value to the widget. The following graph illustrates the example:
Producer Cost Value Added Tax Assessed Tax Withheld Net Tax
A 0 10 1 0 1
B 10 10 2 1 1
C 20 10 3 2 1
D 30 0 0 0 0
Total 30 6 3 3
In comparing the VAT system to the PSC system example supra at note 104, it is
important to note that the government assesses an equal amount of taxes under each
system, six dollars. Nevertheless, the VAT's withholding system adjusts the taxes col-
lected to three dollars (6 - 3 = 3) which corresponds to the total value added.
110. The illustration developed supra at notes 104; 106 and 109, shows the irrelevance
of mergers to the total tax levied under a VAT system. Assume the same firms as in supra
note 106. Firm A adds $10 in value, and merged firm B/C adds $20 in value. Producer
A has no costs, but adds a value of $10 to the widget. The government assesses its one
dollar tax (10% X 10) on the transfer of the uncompleted widget to B/C. Producer B/C
processes the widget adding $20 in value, raising the widget's value to $30. The govern-
ment assesses a 3 dollar tax (30 x 10% = 3) on the transfer of the uncompleted widget to
D. B/C, however, does not remit the entire three dollars to the government. It withholds
the one dollar tax paid to A, and remits two dollars corresponding to its value added. D
does not process the widget and sells it at retail. The example is summarized as follows:
Producer Cost Value Added Tax Assessed Tax Withheld Net Tax
A 0 10 1 0 1
B/C 10 20 3 1 2
D 30 0 0 0 0
Total 30 4 1 3
The net tax in the present example corresponds directly with the total value added, as it
did when B and C were separate entities in the example given supra at note 109. PSC
systems, however, assess and collect different amounts of tax on a product depending
upon the number of transactions in the production process. When B and C were separate
entities, PSC collected six dollars. When B and C merged, PSC collected four dollars.
111. K. DAM, supra note 28, at 140.
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tems rebate taxes paid on exports.1 12 These so called "border tax
adjustments" ensure that exported goods bear no domestic tax bur-
den and put into effect the "destination principle," i.e., internation-
ally traded goods are subject to only the indirect taxes of the country
of destination. 11 3
The PSC system is less sophisticated than the VAT system. It is
easier to administer because there are no regular rebate or withhold-
ing practices and no complex record keeping requirements. The
governmental taxing authority monitors the transactions necessary
in production and assesses the required taxes. PSC taxes are used in
less sophisticated economies. 114 VATs, on the other hand, require
sophisticated withholding procedures, rebate practices, and record
keeping. VAT systems predominate in more sophisticated econo-
mies, particularly in Western Europe. 15
The distinction between VAT and PSC taxes is straight forward.
Both systems tax the product directly and the producer indirectly. In
addition, both systems tax the production process at points of
exchange. VAT withholding practices readjust the tax to account
solely for the value added by the immediate producer. PSC systems
have no established withholding practice and "cascade." In addi-
tion, VAT systems rebate taxes on exported goods. Recently, coun-
tries using PSC tax systems have begun to rebate taxes." 6 The PSC
rebates typically promote exports." 7 They also blur the distinction
between the two tax systems and have caused fairness problems in
United States countervailing duty treatment.
112. M. VON STEINAECKER, supra note 93, at 8. In terms of the example supra at note
109, D receives a rebate of three dollars, constituting the value added tax paid on the
product. Id at 24.
113. Id. at 8.
114. E.g., Colombia (see Leather Handbags From Colombia, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,660
(1978)); Pakistan (see Certain Textiles and Textile Products From Pakistan, 44 Fed. Reg.
40,884 (1979)); India (see Certain Footwear From India, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,588 (1979));
Spain (see Amoxicillin and its Salts From Spain, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,154 (1979)); Argentina
(see Non-Rubber Footwear From Argentina, 44 Fed. Reg. 3474 (1979)); Mexico (see
Processed Asparagus From Mexico, 41 Fed. Reg. 1299 (1976)).
VATs, by contrast, predominate in more sophisticated economies, particularly in West-
ern Europe. See K. DAM, supra note 28, at 140.
115. K. DAM, supra note 28, at 140. See supra note 94.
116. Eg., India (see Certain Footwear From India, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,588 (1979)); Paki-
stan (see Certain Textiles and Textile Products From Pakistan, 44 Fed. Reg. 40,884
(1979)); Colombia (see Leather Handbags From Colombia, 44 Fed. Reg. 18,660 (1978)).
117. Indirect taxes are not generally rebated upon domestic consumption. G. BRYAN,
supra note 32, at 295. Unlike the VAT system, typically only exporters receive rebates in
nations utilizing a PSC system. Id at 296.
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2 Tax Shfing
In 1947, the GATT determined that indirect tax rebates did not
constitute a subsidy to the producer, so long as the rebates were not
excessive."1 8 The GATT did not accord the same subsidy exemption
to direct tax rebates. 119 Two justifications support the distinction
between GATT treatment of direct and indirect taxes. First, the
GATT recognized that countries relying on indirect taxes tradition-
ally have refunded those taxes to make exports price-competitive. 120
The practice is long established and firmly entrenched. Second, the
GATT based the distinction on the economic theory of full tax shift-
ing.121 The theory holds that market prices always reflect the net
amount of indirect taxes assessed on the product sold, but that mar-
ket prices do not reflect the net amount of direct taxes assessed on
the manufacturer's profits. 122 This distinction between the tax sys-
tems remains in the present GATT. Subsequent academic literature,
however, contests the theory of full tax shifting, and threatens the
justification for the subsidy exemption granted to indirect tax
rebates. 123
The theory of full tax shifting holds that market prices of goods
reflect the taxes assessed on the goods. The assumption underlying
the theory is that the price of a good is a function of its cost. An
indirect tax is levied directly on the product at each transaction in its
production process. When an indirect tax raises the price of a prod-
uct, the producer forwards, or shifts, the increase to the consumer in
the form of a higher price.' 24 Similarly, when an indirect tax rebate
reduces the costs associated with a product, the producer forwards,
or shifts, the decrease to the consumer in the form of a lower price.
118. BRYAN, supra note 32, at 293. GATT Article XVI contains the provisions appli-
cable to export subsidies. A supplemental provision to Article XVI states,
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like
product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties
or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be
deemed to be a subsidy.
GAIT, supra note 25, Annex I, Ad Article XVI, 4 BISD at 68. According to this provi-
sion, indirect taxes, which are borne by the product, may be rebated on exports, so long
as the rebate does not exceed the tax levied on like domestic consumption. Id See gen-
erally, J. JACKSON, supra note 26 at 392-95.
119. K. DAM, supra note 28, at 139. In the words of the GATT interpretive note, the
distinction between direct and indirect taxes is founded upon the choice of the phrase
"duties or taxes borne by the likeproduct" and thus describes the duties and taxes which
may be refunded. Id Indirect taxes are borne by the product, while direct taxes are
borne by a producer. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
120. K. DAM, supra note 28, at 139.
121. Id at 139-40, 214.
122. Id
123. Id at 214-15; M. VON STEINAECKER, supra note 94, at 23; G. BRYAN, supra note
32, at 290, 293.
124. K. DAM, supra note 28, at 214.
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A tax rebate lowers the price of the finished product which enables
consumers to purchase more and increase their level of satisfac-
tion.1 25 The GATT determined that the benefit was fully shifted to
consumers, increasing their welfare, and that the tax rebate did not
benefit the producer and was not a subsidy.
As a corollary to the tax shifting acceptance of rebates, tax shift-
ing also allows offsets for indirect taxes paid but not rebated. If a
product benefits from a countervailable subsidy (i.e. a subsidy
against which the United States may levy a countervailing duty) and
is also subject to PSC taxes which are not rebated, the United States
should reduce the countervailing duty by the amount of the tax paid.
As with rebates, consumers benefit from the offset of indirect taxes
paid but not rebated. The offset reduces the countervailing duty
and, according to the theory of full tax shifting, the producer will
shift the benefit to the consumer in the form of a price lower than
would have occurred had the entire countervailing duty been
levied.126
Recent economic literature questions the veracity of full tax
shifting.127 Economists believe that price changes are not deter-
mined solely by costs, but by a combination of cost and the pro-
ducer's perception of the market reaction to a price change. 128 A
125. G. BRYAN, supra note 32, at 274.
126. The United States Treasury Department adopted this approach in allowing off-
sets for taxes paid but not rebated. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 123..
128. Economists argue that the degree to which indirect taxes are shifted depends on
the elasticity of demand. Only in the case where demand is perfectly inelastic (a vertical
line) is the indirect tax fully shifted forward to the buyer.
S
S
D = demand
S = Supply before tax
x r ST = Supply after tax
e = Equilibrium price
before tax
el = Equilibrium price
after tax
U X = Amount of tax
Y = Amount of the shift
X>Yx{ D
QUANTITY
As the elasticity of demand decreases (demand curve becomes closer to vertical) the dif-
ference between X and Y will decrease, meaning that a greater portion of the tax burden
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producer, seeking to maximize profits, will raise prices in response to
a tax assessment only if the decrease in the number of products
demanded is small enough so that profits after the change are at least
as large as they were before the price increase. Similarly, a producer
will only reduce prices in response to a tax rebate if the increase in
the amount demanded is large enough so that profits after the
change are at least as large as they were before the price increase.
Thus, the producer must take account of the market reaction to a
price change before raising or lowering prices in reaction to tax pay-
ments or rebates. Economists call the market reaction to price
changes "price elasticity."' 29 When a market is highly elastic, a price
change causes a large shift in the quantity demanded. i30 When a
market exhibits low elasticity, a price change causes a small shift in
the quantity demanded.1 31
The recognition of demand elasticity as a factor in the pro-
ducer's decision to raise or lower prices alters the subsidy analysis of
indirect taxation and rebates. Originally, the GATT assumed that
indirect taxes and rebates were fully shifted to the consumer:132 tax
assessments automatically resulted in higher consumer prices, and
tax rebates automatically resulted in lower consumer prices. Present
theory, however, does not agree with this simple view. Economists
now believe that consumer prices respond to tax assessments or
rebates only so long as the producer believes that the quantity
demanded by the market responds in a manner which maintains or
increases profits. The problem is demonstrated most clearly in the
context of indirect tax rebates. According to the new theory of tax
shifting, if a producer does not believe that market demand will
increase sufficiently in response to a price decrease, it will not shift
the entire tax rebate to the consumer and only the producer will ben-
efit immediately from the rebate. i33
Despite contemporary modification of the theory of tax shifting,
the Tokyo Round did not alter GATT treatment of indirect tax
rebates. The Subsidies Code maintains prior practice, stating that
rebated indirect taxes are not export subsidies. 134 Given the doubt
is being shifted. K. DAM, supra note 28, at 214-16; G. BRYAN, supra note 32, at 290, 293.
If indirect taxes are not fully shifted forward to the purchaser, then a rebate of those
taxes unduly benefits the manufacturer, that is, the manufacturer is subsidized by the
amount of the difference between the total tax incidence and the amount actually shifted.
Id The producer receives an actual export benefit. Id
129. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 379-81 (9th ed. 1973).
130. Id
131. Id
132. See supra note 118.
133. M. VON STEINAECKER, supra note 93, at 24.
134. See Annex A and Interpretive Notes, supra note 38.
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that has been cast upon the full tax shifting theory justifying GATT
treatment of indirect tax rebates, only the tradition argument 35
remains to justify the subsidy exemption.
B. TREASURY PRACTICE PRIOR TO THE TAA
Pre-TAA United States countervailing duty practice adhered
strictly to the theory of full tax shifting. Under the discretion
allowed by both the Trade Act of 1930 and the GATT, the Treasury
did not impose countervailing duties on rebated indirect taxes,
136
and allowed offsets for indirect taxes paid but not rebated.1 37 Identi-
fying the abuses caused by the excessive rebate or offset of indirect
taxes constituted the principal issue in pre-TAA practice.
The complex operation of indirect taxes presented opportunities
for nations to mask export subsidies.1 38 Rebating indirect taxes in
excess of taxes actually paid conferred a benefit upon the exported
product. Declaring the payments as tax rebates removed them from
consideration as subsidies. Thus, the declaration of a payment to an
exporter as an indirect tax rebate could mask an otherwise impermis-
sible subsidy which ordinarily would provoke a countervailing duty.
If the foreign determinations were accepted blindly and offset by the
United States countervailing duty administering authority, the
United States could excessively reduce its countervailing duty.
Thus, the United States developed standards to determine when a
rebate claim or a tax payment claim was excessive.
The Treasury Department faced conflicting considerations in
establishing a standard for excessive rebates. Fairness considera-
tions required equal treatment of VAT and PSC rebates;139 the diffi-
culty in calculating PSC rebates accurately, however, made
135. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
136. Certain Footwear From India, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,588 (1979); Amoxicillin and its
Salts From Spain, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,154 (1979); Ampicillin Trihydrate and its Salts From
Spain, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,484 (1979); Oleoresins From Spain, 44 Fed. Reg. 11,214 (1979);
Papermaking Machines and Parts Thereof From Finland, 44 Fed. Reg. 10,451 (1979);
Non-Rubber Footwear From Argentina, 44 Fed. Reg. 3474 (1979); Chains or Parts
Thereof, of Case Iron, Iron or Steel From Italy, 44 Fed. Reg. 3473 (1979); Certain Textile
Products From Uruguay, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,424 (1978); Certain Textiles and Textile Prod-
ucts From Argentina, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,421 (1978); Non-Rubber'Footwear From Spain, 43
Fed. Reg. 25,814 (1978); Unwrought Zinc From Spain, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,814 (1978); Bot-
tled Green Olives From Spain, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,813 (1978); Leather Handbags From
Uruguay, supra note 75; Processed Asparagus From Mexico, 41 Fed. Reg. 1299 (1976).
This practice was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 437 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1978).
137. Certain Footwear From India, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,583 (1979); Certain Textiles and
Textile Products From Pakistan, 44 Fed. Reg. 40,884 (1979); Leather Handbags From
Columbia, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,660 (1978).
138. For an explanation of indirect tax system mechanics, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 103-13.
139. Revised Method, supra note 74.
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treatment equal with VAT rebates difficult.140 According to the the-
ory of full tax shifting, producers shift both VAT and PSC tax
rebates to consumers. Thus, in fairness to exporters laboring under
each system, Treasury allowed a subsidy exemption for both
rebates.' 4 1 The inability of Treasury to calculate the amount of a
non-excessive rebate, however, resulted in different tests for each
indirect tax system. VAT systems provide an accurate measure of
excessive indirect rebates. PSC systems do not. VAT systems
require extensive record keeping and provide an accurate measure of
taxes assessed on each product.' 42 A comparison of rebates allowed
on exported goods and taxes assessed on similar domestic goods pro-
vided a simple test for whether an exported good received an undue
benefit by virtue of an excessive indirect tax rebate. 143 The Treasury
Department declared that VAT rebates on exports were not excessive
if identical to or less than taxes assessed on similar goods consumed
domestically. 44 PSC taxes provided no comparison similar to the
VAT test. PSC systems did not have extensive record keeping
requirements. 145 While fairness considerations required that Treas-
ury treat VAT rebates and PSC rebates equally, the inability to cal-
culate whether a PSC rebate was excessive provided a stumbling
block to the allowance of PSC rebates without a countervailing duty.
Treasury solved the dilemma by adopting the "physical incor-
poration" test. 146 The Treasury Department did not assess a coun-
tervailing duty against a rebate corresponding to goods physically
incorporated into an exported product. Stated in another way, PSC
rebates on goods physically incorporated into an export were not
countervailable subsidies. This test compromised the fairness and
calculation considerations. The test allowed countervailing duty
exemptions for both VAT and PSC taxes, yet it provided a principled
method to accurately limit PSC rebate claims.
The theory of full tax shifting justifies the offset of indirect taxes
paid but not rebated. VAT systems generally have a rebate mecha-
nism.147 Thus, the offset issue arises only in cases involving exports
from nations utilizing a PSC tax system.' 48 As with rebates, however,
140. Id
141. Chains or Parts Thereof, of Cast Iron, Iron or Steel From Italy, 44 Fed. Reg.
3473 (1979) (PSC taxes); Notice of Revised Method of Calculation With Regard to Cer-
tain Indirect Taxes, 44 Fed. Reg. 3478 (1979) (VATs).
142. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
143. Revised Method, supra note 74.
144. Id
145. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
146. Revised Method, supra note 74.
147. Id
148. Id
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PSC tax systems provide no accurate method of calculating whether
taxes paid were excessive.' 49 Treasury applied the physical incorpo-
ration test to regulate the offset of PSC taxes paid but not rebated. 150
Treasury considered only unrebated taxes on goods physically incor-
porated into the final export as a permissible offset to existing
subsidies.
Utilizing the physical incorporation test, the Treasury Depart-
ment exempted indirect tax rebates from countervailing duties, and
allowed offsets to PSC taxes paid but not rebated. In doing so, the
Treasury satisfied both the theory of full tax shifting and the need to
treat VAT and PSC taxes equally. Finally, Treasury used the physi-
cal incorporation test to overcome calculation difficulties inherent in
PSC taxes.
C. POST-TAA PRACTICE
1. TAA Indirect Tax Provisions
The TAA enacted subsidy provisions regulating United States
countervailing duty treatment of tax rebates 51 and United States off-
set treatment of unrebated taxes.5 2 The rebate provision, TAA sec-
tion 771(5), expressly adopts the Subsidies Code and is consistent
with the theory of full tax shifting. 53 The offset provision, TAA
section 771(6), rejects prior Treasury Department practice and does
not allow offsets for indirect taxes paid but not rebated. 154 Thus,
under TAA section 771(5) the new countervailing duty administer-
ing authority, the International Trade Administration (ITA), will
exempt both VAT rebates and PSC rebates satisfying the physical
incorporation test from countervailing duties. Nevertheless, under
TAA section 771(6) the ITA will not offset a countervailing duty to
account for PSC taxes paid but not rebated.
The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code re-enacted rebate provisions
consistent with the theory of full tax shifting. The Subsidies Code
prohibits export subsidies on non-primary products' 55 and allows the
use of countervailing duties to combat them. 56 In addition, the Sub-
sidies Code provides an illustrative list of prohibited export subsi-
dies157 which includes provisions consistent with United States
149. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 137.
151. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(5), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
152. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
153. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
155. Subsidies Code, supra note 38, Art. 9, BISD (26th Supp.), at 68.
156. Subsidies Code, supra note 38, Art. 4, BISD (26th Supp.), at 61.
157. Annex I and Illustrative Notes, supra note 38.
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Treasury Department treatment of indirect tax rebates. 58 The pro-
hibited subsidies include:
(g) The exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribu-
tion of exported products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in
respect of the production and distribution of like products when sold for
domestic consumption.
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect
taxes on goods or services used in the production of exported products
in excess of the exemption, remission or deferral of like prior stage
cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services used in the production of
like products when sold for domestic consumption; provided, however,
that prior stage cumulative indirect taxes may be exempted, remitted or
deferred on exported products even when not exempted, remitted or
deferred on like products when sold for domestic consumption, if the
prior stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on goods that are physi-
cally incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported
product.15 9
Thus, the Subsidies Code precludes the assessment of countervailing
duties on PSC and VAT rebates, so long as the rebates do not exceed
indirect taxes levied on goods consumed domestically. 160 In addi-
tion, it precludes the assessment of countervailing duties on PSC
taxes rebated on goods physically incorporated into the export.' 6'
This provision is consistent with both prior Treasury rebate practice
and the theory of full tax shifting. 162 TAA section 771(5) defines sub-
sidies against which the United States will levy countervailing duties.
It expressly adopts the Subsidies Code Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies. 63
The Subsidies Code contains no provision regarding offset treat-
ment of indirect taxes paid but not rebated. TAA section 771(6), 64
on the other hand, contains an inclusive listing of permissible off-
sets. 165 Indirect taxes paid but not rebated do not appear in section
771(6). 166 Thus, section 771(6) radically alters United States offset
treatment of indirect taxes. Under discretionary Treasury practice,
"physically incorporated" PSC taxes that were paid but not rebated
158. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
159. Annex I and Illustrative Notes, supra note 38, (g), (h) [footnotes omitted].
160. Id
161. Id
162. Prior to the TAA, the Treasury Department did not impose countervailing duties
on VAT rebates so long as they did not exceed domestic VAT taxes assessed. Treasury
did not impose countervailing duties on PSC rebates which satisfied the physical incor-
poration test. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
163. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(5)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (Supp. IV
1980).
164. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
165. The legislative history of TAA section 771(6) states that the enumeration therein
is all inclusive. See supra note 64.
166. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
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offset any countervailing duty assessed against an import. 167 The
ITA, restricted by TAA section 771(6), may no longer offset counter-
vailing duties by an amount corresponding to indirect taxes paid but
not rebated.
TAA section 771(5) and TAA section 771(6) are inconsistent
both in their treatment of PSC taxes and in their approach to tax
shifting. TAA section 771(5) permits the rebate of VAT and PSC
taxes without a countervailing duty penalty. 168 TAA section 771(6)
eliminates the unrebated payment of PSC taxes from the list of per-
missible offsets, even when conditions which would legitimize a
rebate of the same taxes are satisfied. 169 The TAA, by sanctioning
the rebate of PSC taxes, yet disallowing their offset, prompts foreign
governments to institute rebate practices and capitalize on the coun-
tervailing duty benefits that the United States accords to indirect tax
rebates. Nevertheless, the institution of rebate practices by foreign
governments presents no significant economic change in indirect tax
policy.
TAA section 771(5) and TAA section 771(6) are also inconsis-
tent on tax shifting grounds. The theory of full tax shifting justifies
both the exclusion of non-excessive rebated taxes from counter-
vailing duties 170 and the offset of non-excessive taxes paid but not
rebated. TAA section 771(5) is consistent with prior United States
and GATT practice, which was based upon the theory of full tax
shifting.' 7 ' Thus, the inconsistency between TAA section 771(5) and
TAA section 771(6) is a product of the radical change in offset policy
that Congress created when it enacted TAA section 771(6). Despite
prior reliance on the full tax shifting theory, Congress did not
examine tax shifting considerations when adopting the TAA.
2 TAA Section 771(6): Congressional Justg'cations for the New
Offset Treatment of Indirect Taxes
Congress advanced several arguments to justify the change in
offset practice created by TAA section 771(6).172 First, Congress
asserted that calculating indirect taxes would be "no more than a
guess."'173 Second, Congress feared that allowing indirect taxes as
167. See supra notes 137, 149-50 and accompanying text.
168. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(5), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
See Annex A, supra note 58.
169. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 471-72 ("The list is narrowly drawn and is all inclusive.").
170. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
172. 125 CONG. REC. 20,168 (1979) (statement of Sen Heinz).
173. Id.
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offsets would confer an "undue amount of benefit" on the pro-
ducer.174 Third, Congress believed that the United States should not
base its countervailing duty policy on the varying tax methodologies
of different nations.175
Most nations utilizing a PSC system cannot account for the
number of transactions occurring during the manufacture of a prod-
uct. Thus, it is difficult to calculate the exact amount of the tax lev-
ied.176 Some nations attempt to estimate the amount of taxes levied
and rebate the estimated tax incidence. 77 Consequently, United
States countervailing duty offsets based upon foreign estimates of
PSC rebates would be arbitrary. Congressional concern with the
arbitrary nature of PSC rebates is justified.
Congress has indicated that an undue benefit accrues to export-
ers under a PSC system because PSC taxes are not "cascaded."'' 7 8
This argument seizes on the difference between VAT and PSC taxes,
and ignores the cumulative nature of PSC taxes.' 79 Because PSC
taxes are cumulative they are, in fact, a "cascade" type tax. 80 While
PSC taxes may benefit exporters unduly, Congress is incorrect in
claiming that it is the lack of PSC cascade effect that causes this
result.
The undue benefit issue is related closely to the calculation
issue. Congress feared that exporters under a PSC system would
receive an undue benefit from "excessive" PSC tax rebates or "exces-
sive" claims of PSC tax payments.' 8' "Excessive" tax rebates, only
partially disclosed to United States authorities, would escape coun-
tervailing duties normally levied against such subsidies. Similarly,
"excessive" claims of PSC tax payments would provide an undue
benefit in the form of an enlarged United States countervailing duty
offset.
Prior to the passage of the TAA, the Treasury Department
addressed this problem when it adopted the physical incorporation
test for PSC rebates and offsets. 8 2 The physical incorporation test
limited possible undue benefits which otherwise might occur if PSC
taxes were rebated perfunctorily. Treasury efforts to adopt similar
174. Id
175. Id
176. On the varying quantity of PSC taxes assessed on similar goods see supra notes
103-06 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 137.
178. 125 CONG. REc. 20,168 (1979) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
179. For an explanation of the distinction between VAT and PSC taxes see supra notes
101-13 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 104-06 and accompanying text.
181. 125 CONG. REc. 20,168 (1979) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
182. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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guidelines with respect to unrebated taxes that deserved offsets also
represented a good faith attempt to prevent undue benefits.1 83 In
addition, the administering authority may further guard against
undue benefits by adopting evidentiary requirements that are as
strict as those proposed for dislocation costs. 184 Thus, the exporter
would have to show that the physical incorporation test was "defi-
nitely established by reliable, verified evidence."' 85 The drafters of
the TAA and the negotiators of the Subsidies Code apparently
accepted the compromise struck between fairness principles and
accuracy goals when they adopted the physical incorporation test for
rebate analysis. 8 6 For Congress to allow the physical incorporation
test in its section 771(5) treatment of indirect tax rebates, yet not
allow the same test to regulate the offset treatment of similar taxes, is
anomalous.
Congress evinced concern that the administering authority
"should not base countervailing duty policy on the tax methodolo-
gies selected by varying countries." 87 Nevertheless, the TAA recog-
nizes the significant differences between VAT and PSC tax systems.
TAA section 771(5), which determines the proper method of rebate
calculation, distinguishes between the type of tax system employed
in the exporting country. 88 It is inconsistent to criticize offset prac-
tice on the grounds of tax methodology differentiation, when the
underlying controversy grows out of a system which expressly distin-
guishes tax systems for the purpose of ascertaining permissible
rebate levels.
D. ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS AND A
PROPOSAL FOR SECTION 771(6)
The congressional arguments for disallowing indirect tax offsets
under TAA section 771(6) are not completely satisfactory. Congres-
sional objections to foreign tax distinctions in offset policy are incon-
sistent with the distinction drawn between PSC and VAT rebates in
TAA section 771(5). Congressional fears of calculation difficulties
and undue benefit accruing to exporters are alleviated largely by the
183. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. The Subsidies Code Illustrative List of Export Subsidies contains the physical
incorporation test. See supra text accompanying note 159. The TAA expressly adopted
the Illustrative List. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(5)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)
(Supp. IV 1980).
187. 125 CONG. REC. 20,168 (1979) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
188. TAA section 771(5)(A) incorporates the Subsidies Code Illustrative List of
Export Subsidies, which, in turn, recognizes the distinction between VAT and PSC taxes.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 771(5)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
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physical incorporation test and the strict burden of proof placed on
the exporter. 18 9
Unlike the arguments of Congress, current tax shifting theories
provide adequate justification for section 771(6). 190 The theory of
full tax shifting justified indirect tax offsets on the grounds that the
consumer, and not the producer, benefitted from the offset.' 9' Econ-
omists now widely recognize that indirect taxes are partially, not
fully, shifted forward. 192 The amount of tax shifted forward fluctu-
ates with the producer's perception of demand price elasticity. 93
Because taxes are not fully shifted, offsets equal to total taxes are not
economically justified.194 Similarly, complete prohibitions of indi-
rect taxes as offsets, such as that enacted by section 771(6), are not
economically justified. Allowing complete offsets subsidizes the pro-
ducer in the amount of taxes shifted to the consumer. Similarly,
prohibiting the offsets penalizes the producer in the amount of taxes
not actually shifted.
The administrative cost accompanying a case-by-case approach
would be prohibitive. Such an approach would require an examina-
tion of the demand price elasticity for each product under scrutiny.
While the notion of demand price elasticity is a useful theoretical
tool, its actual calculation is extremely difficult. 195
Assuming that a case-by-case approach is infeasible, which rule,
complete offset recognition or offset prohibition, comports with
United States countervailing duty policy? In large part, caution
characterizes United States policy.196 Congress traditionally has dis-
couraged practices which benefit foreign producers. Prohibiting
unrebated taxes from offset consideration does not benefit foreign
producers. Allowing unrebated taxes as offsets will benefit foreign
189. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 178-86.
191. See supra text accompanying note 125.
192. See supra note 127.
193. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
194. One commentator states that "[o]ne conclusion to be drawn from the economic
literature is that full refund of an indirect tax constitutes in fact a subsidy to exports and
therefore has the same distorting effect on international trade that any other export sub-
sidy would have." K. DAM, supra note 28, at 215.
195. Elasticity of demand is much too difficult to measure on a case-by-case basis, for
it to be the determining factor in CVD calculations. Professors Posner and Easterbrook
write: "It is, to put it mildly, hard to measure elasticities, and a finding [with respect to
elasticity] is bound to be ambiguous." R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST
CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 336 (2d ed. 1981). "Unfortunately,
while there are econometric techniques for estimating . . . elasticity of demand ...
because of dala problems they rarely yield very reliable results." d at 350 (emphasis
added).
196. In fact the alteration of the Trade Agreements Act demonstrates congressional
caution. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
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producers. Thus, the rule accepted in TAA section 771(6) complies
with traditional congressional intent. The policy most likely will
have two results: (1) in the short run, the producer will be penalized
to the extent that taxes are shifted; and (2) in the long run, the coun-
try of origin may revise its tax system to provide for -indirect tax
rebates.
Contemporary theories of tax shifting shed new light on the
actual effects of offsets and rebates. Historically, United States toler-
ance of rebates has rested on the acceptance of traditional foreign tax
practices; that tolerance likely will continue despite their distortive
characteristics.19 7 The allowance of offsets by the United States did
not rest on foreign traditions. The United States Treasury Depart-
ment allowed offsets in an attempt to treat rebates and unrebated
taxes fairly, and to the extent that indirect taxes were believed to be
shifted. 198 Because permitting a full offset in the entire amount of
taxes paid effectively subsidizes the producer, a flat prohibition of
unrebated taxes as offsets, though necessarily inexact, must be the
preferred rule. Thus, due to the current belief that indirect taxes are
not fully shifted, rather than the reasons articulated in the legislative
history, TAA section 771(6) reaches a justifiable result. Any modifi-
cation of TAA section 771(6) to allow dislocation costs should not
alter the effect of TAA section 771(6) in terms of unrebated taxes.
IV
CONCLUSION
Each nation must make commitments to effectuate the goals of
a multilateral agreement. Many nations will benefit from free trade,
and the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code seeks to promote that goal.
Thus, it is in the interest of each nation to interpret the Subsidies
Code in accordance with both its express provisions and its spirit.
The TAA, United States legislation adopting the Subsidies Code,
generally complies with the intended free trade goals. In several
instances, however, the TAA deviates from free trade ideals. In par-
ticular, TAA section 771(6) does not allow dislocation costs or unre-
bated indirect taxes as offsets.
The prohibition of dislocation costs as offsets is technically
within the letter of the Subsidies Code. Nevertheless, the prohibition
violates the spirit of the Code because it prevents a reduction in the
gross subsidy by costs which necessarily reduce the actual export
197. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. The argument that this tradition
should be accorded considerable weight is discussed in J. Michael Finger What the
"Zenith Case" Might Have Meant, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 48-49 (1979).
198. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
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benefit received by the producer. Potential abuse of administrative
discretion should not be an obstacle. If properly circumscribed by
clearly articulated and strict evidentiary standards, the exercise of
administrative discretion need not be arbitrary. Allowing disloca-
tion costs is within the spirit of United States countervailing duty
policy, and in fact furthers the goals of that policy. Congress should
not disallow these offsets because they contain potential discretion-
ary abuses and present preliminary calculation problems.
The prohibition of indirect taxes as offsets presents a more diffi-
cult question. The Subsidies Code, relying on the theory of full tax
shifting, allows non-excessive tax rebates to escape countervailing
duties. The Code does not contain an offset provision. The TAA
adopted the Subsidies Code countervailing duty exemption for indi-
rect tax rebates. Nevertheless, inconsistent with the theory of full tax
shifting, the TAA prohibits indirect tax offsets. Congress attempted
to justify this inconsistency using calculation, undue benefit, and
variable tax methodology arguments. None of these offers a com-
pletely satisfactory explanation for the inconsistent treatment
accorded to rebates and offsets. New theories of partial tax shifting,
however, provide a satisfactory justification for section 771(6). The
administrative burden that would be required to determine the vari-
able amount of tax actually shifted provides a satisfactory rationale
for the prohibition of indirect tax offsets. Nevertheless, the United
States rebate policy is inconsistent with the offset provision and is
unlikely to accord with the offset provision due to the continued rec-
ognition by the United States of longstanding European tax prac-
tice199 contained in TAA section 771(5).
Craig.4. MacDonnell
199. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; Notice of Revised Method of Calcu-
lation, supra Note 141.
